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Lewis' Imperatives of Right 
by W I L L I A M  K. FRANKENA 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
IN A review of C. I. Lewis' The  Ground and Nature o[ the Right  I raised the 
question whether he regards the basic imperatives of right as a priori in the 
sense of analytic or as a posteriori and empirical, these being the only alter- 
natives that seemed to be open to him in view of his theory of knowledge 
and his rejection of noncognitive theories of ethical judgments? To this 
question Mr. Arthur M. Wheeler thinks a rather simple answer can be given 
on the basis of Lewis' previous and subsequent writings, viz., that the im- 
peratives referred to are analytic "for a sphere of enquiry," although more 
concrete ethical maxims are not3 I agree that, with Our Social Inheritance 
added to Lewis' other works, we have the makings of an answer to my ques- 
tion, but I do not think that the answer as formulated by Wheeler is either 
clear or complete. Partly as a result of reading and thinking about Wheeler's 
note, however, I believe I can now say what Lewis' answer to my question is. 
First, we must notice a point neglected by Wheeler. As part of his argu- 
ment he quotes Lewis as saying in Our Social Inheritance that "the basic 
principle [of ethics] must be in some sense a priori." In a footnote to this 
passage Lewis does something to explain the sense in which he takes his basic 
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principle to be a priori. He suggests that it is a priori in the sense that "the 
repudiation of it would be self-contravening--a pragmatic contradiction," 
and then adds, "Such a non-repudiable principle is 'pragmatically a priori.' 
The broadest of imperatives, 'Be consistent' [of which the ethical imperative 
is simply a specification], exemplifies this matter--one who should adopt the 
decision, 'Disregard consistency,' would be deciding to disregard his de- 
cisions as soon as made. And adherence to that decision would require that 
it be promptly disregarded. ''~ 
This basic imperative, which I shall call P, Lewis formulates in several 
ways: "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you"; "So act 
that you could will the maxim of your conduct to become a universal law"; 
"Do no act which contravenes any principle which you would call upon other 
men universally to respect. ''4 But the first point is that, however it be worded, 
Lewis regards P as a priori in the sense of pragmatically a priori. Is he also 
holding that P is a priori in some other sense? And is he holding that it is 
analytic? If he is holding that it is logically a priori or analytic in the sense of 
being true by definition (i.e., that not-P is logically self-contradictory), then 
it is hard to see why he says that it is pragmatically a priori. Hence I do not 
think Wheeler's argument can possibly be construed as showing that Lewis 
thinks P to be analytic in the sense of being true by virtue of the very mean- 
ing of the terms involved in it (which is the sense of "analytic" that I had 
in mind in stating my question). 
Thus, if P is analytic for Lewis, it must be in some other sense. I think 
there is a second sense of "analytic" in Lewis' mind. He says, for instance, 
that P is "definitive of iustice" or of right action, as Wheeler's quotations 
show. To say this, however, is not to say that P is analytic in the sense of 
being true by definition of the terms involved; it is to say rather that action 
in accordance with P is by definition iust or right. Here P is "definitive," 
but of a term which it does not contain, namely "iust" or "morally right." I 
take Wheeler to be correct in thinking that Lewis regards P as analytic in 
this sense. 
Now, from P's being analytic in this sense, nothing follows about its being 
either logically or pragmatically a priori. Therefore, unless there is a third 
sense of "a priori" in Lewis' mind, he cannot be maintaining that P is a priori 
because it is analytic in this sense. Again, I think Lewis has such a third sense 
of "a priori" in mind. This is suggested by one of Wheeler's quotations in  
which Lewis seems to say that, if P is definitive of iustice in the way iust indi- 
cated, then it is a priori, since it formulates "definitive concepts or categori- 
cal tests" for the field of moral inquiry. And, of course, if P is analytic in the 
second sense, then it is also a priori in this third sense. In this respect, too, 
Wheeler's answer is correct. It remains true, however, that P is not analytic 
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in the first sense or a priori in the logical sense. In this respect Wheeler 's 
answer is unclear as well as incomplete. 
For a clear and complete answer (in outline at least), I suggest we must 
distinguish three senses of "a priori" and two of "analytic" as follows: a 
priori ( 1 ) ----- logically a priori - -  true by definition ---- analytic (1); a priori 
(2) - -  pragmatically a priori; a priori (3) - -  analytic (2) - -  being definitive 
of . . . Then, I further suggest, P is for Lewis not a priori (1) or analytic 
( 1 ). But it is analytic (2) and a priori ( 3 ), and it is also pragmatically a priori 
or a priori (2). 
This, however, is perhaps too cryptic to be very helpful, and I shall try to 
explain briefly what I now take Lewis' view of the basic imperative of right 
to be. W e  must distinguish, more carefully than he himself does, 
(a) Principle P. This has the form of an imperative--"Be . . . "  or 
"Do  . . ."--and it does not contain the term "just" or "right. ''5 
(b) The statement, S, that actions obeying P are just or right. This con- 
tains the term "just" or "right" and is true by definition of this term, 
and hence analytic (1) and a priori (1). 
Here P and not S is a (or rather the) basic imperative of right. It defines 
justice or moral rightness but is not true by definition and so not analytic ( 1 ) 
or a priori (1). In fact, it is hard to see how it can be thought of as true or 
false at all, and it would seem that about it Lewis must be some kind of a 
noncognitivist. 6 But it has, nevertheless, an assured status which cannot be 
claimed for all imperatives or for all "definitive" principles--the repudiation 
of it is self-contravening in a particularly crucial pragmatic, though not 
strictly logical, way. Hence it is, in an important sense, valid a priori (in 
Feigl's terms, it can be decisively vindicated, though it cannot be validated 
since it is presupposed in all validation). Its being valid a priori in this sense, 
however, is independent of the fact that it is definitive of justice or moral 
rightness; it rests rather on a fact of human nature--the fact of our rational- 
ity. 7 
This interpretation shows, by the way, how Lewis can hold that the ethi- 
cal imperative is a priori and also be a "pragmatist." It should be noted, how- 
ever, that his manner of combining pragmatism and apriorism here seems to 
be different from that adopted in A Pragmatic Concep t ion  of the A Priori or 
in M i n d  and the W o r l d  Order. Also, his notion of the pragmatic a priori in 
Our Social Inheri tance appears to be stronger than the notion of "pragmatic 
justification" proposed by Feigl and Rice? Lewis' pragmatically a priori 
seems to be more like Rice's "congenitally a priori" than like his "pragmati- 
cally justified." 
Of course, questions remain. Is the conception of the pragmatically a priori 
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wi thout  diffculty? Is P pragmatically a priori if taken in a sense which can 
plausibly be held to be definitive of justice or of moral  rightness? Is P, taken 
in tha t  sense, an application of the  imperative of rationality? Is P as stated 
by Lewis definitive of justice, and, even if so, is it definitive of moral  right- 
ness (as a necessary condit ion,  a sufficient condit ion,  or bo th )?  However,  if 
these questions can be answered affirmatively, then  Lewis has answered my 
ques t ion- -and  perhaps also the quest ion of moral  philosophy. 
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A Note on Austin's Performative 
Theory of Knowledge 
by B E R N A R D  M A Y O  
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
THE late Professor J. L. Austin's "performat ive"  analysis of 'I know u has 
been of tener  cited as a classical discovery than subjected to rigorous criticism. 
I shall not  a t t empt  such criticism here. In this no te  I want  to draw a t tent ion  
to a class of cases, deliberately excluded by Austin, which seem to s t rengthen 
rather  than weaken the  force of his performative analysis. Austin concerns 
